

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130437 U.S. Marine PFC Robert Harbula talks with wounded Royal Marine Sgt John W. Whiting, who awaits evacuation by planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing from Yonpo Airfield, south of Hungnam.

weather. At Majon-Dong, the commandos mounted U.S. Army trucks, which ferried them down to the assembly area prepared at Hungnam. With elements of the 5th Marines, the commandos boarded the transport USS General George M. Randall (AP 115) and set sail for the port of Pusan. From there the commandos moved west to Masan, where they spent Christmas with the 1st Marine Division.

The Chosin Reservoir campaign ended the involvement of 41 Commando with the U.S. Marines, although it did not end their combat role in Korea. With the force now greatly reduced in strength, having suffered 93 casualties, the Commando returned to Camp McGill, Japan, where it refitted, took on new personnel, and resumed training as a raiding force. Once again, operational control of 41 Commando fell to Commander, Naval Forces, Far East.

Rested and re-equipped, 41 Commando resumed its role as a

raiding force. After a practice raid at Kure, Japan, a combined force of Commando, U.S. Navy UDT, and other support personnel, participated in a major raid aimed at the port city of Sorve-dong, 15 miles south of Songjin, with the support of two U.S. Navy destroyers, the heavy cruiser USS St. Paul (CA 73), and the aircraft carriers USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) and USS Boxer (CV 21). On 7 April 1951, 277 commandos, led by Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, destroyed more than 100 feet of railroad embankment by creating craters 16 feet deep. Antipersonnel mines were then left in the area. The Soryedong raid was accomplished under the cover of aircraft from the two carriers and naval gunfire provided by the St. Paul. So complete was the surprise and so effective the shield of naval gunfire, the Commando suffered no casualties during the raid, which lasted approximately eight hours. Unfortunately, five villagers were killed

and 15 wounded by naval gunfire.


Periods of inactivity followed, during which future operations and a possible return to the 1st Marine Division were discussed. Then in July, C Troop left Japan as the advance party assigned to establish a forward operating base on the island of Yo-do in Wonsan harbor, more than 60 miles behind U.N. lines. The group also set up a rear base near Sasebo, Japan.

Wonsan harbor is a large bay guarded by two peninsulas. Inside and across the entrance are a number of islands, the largest being Yo-do. During the ongoing Operation War Dance, three destroyers circled within the bay seeking targets of opportunity. When 41 Commando arrived, Korean Marines and a number of intelligence gathering organizations garrisoned the islands. Here, the Commando ventured out on reconnaissance missions, oftenkavaks. times in two-man Throughout the summer and early

A Royal Marine searches a North Korean house for Communist soldiers during a raid to destroy enemy installations and supply lines near Songjin, where the main north-south railroad runs close to the sea.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428239





fall of 1951, the Commando, with its main base on Yo-do Island, conducted raids up and down the northeastern coast of the Korean peninsula, often landed from U.S. Navy high-speed transports.

In the process of carrying out these raids, the Commando occupied several more islands as patrol bases. Royal Marines from B Troop, commanded by Captain E. T. G. Shuldham, occupied Mo-do on 9 August, while commandos from D Troop, commanded by Captain Anthony Stoddart, seized Tae-do, near a former leper colony. In a separate but related action, D Troop commandos under the command of Lieutenant John R. H. Walter took the island of Hwangto-do back after Communist forces overran the Korean Marine detachment there. On Hwangto-do, Royal Marines set up heavy 81mm mortars and a 75mm recoilless rifle to harass enemy positions and interdict enemy troop movements on the mainland. Other Royal Marines made six canoe landings on Hodo Pando. In one raid, on 30 August, enemy troops killed Lieutenant John Harwood and Sergeant Charles Barnes of B Troop in a daylong firefight. When the landing craft transporting B Troop ashore broke down off Mo-do on its way to another raid a few days later, the enemy managed to capture five commandos, including Troop

Sergeant Major James Day. On 27 September, Drysdale accompanied B Troop on board the transport *Wantuck* for yet another raid into the Songjin area. There, one party secured a road tunnel to attract enemy reaction while a second made a clandestine landing and ambushed the enemy reinforcements. This was the last time Drysdale led 41 Commando into combat.

On 3 October, D Troop, reinforced by assault engineers, UDT swimmers, and a rocket launcher team from B Troop, set out on board the transport Wantuck for operations south of Chongjin. After a night rehearsal on the 4th, the Commando attempted to launch the main mission. As the approached the North force Korean coastline, UDT swimmers discovered a much heavier enemy presence and the mission was scrubbed. On 15 October. Lieutenant Colonel Ferris N. Grant, a veteran of World War II and a graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps' Command and Staff School at Quantico, Virginia, relieved Drysdale and assumed command of 41 Commando.

While the primary purpose of the commando raids was to collect intelligence and harass enemy supply routes, the ever-present threat of a raid kept large bodies of enemy troops committed as security forces, thus denying their use elsewhere. In one major raid, on the night of 4 December, British commandos landed from the transport Bass and carried out attacks against enemy communications lines in Wonsan. Although they met some opposition, the commandos managed to damage railway tunnels and inflict a number of casualties. The enemy slightly wound several commandos before the Marines were withdrawn.

Other Royal Marines, attached

41 Commando Raiding Techniques

part from the Soyre-Dong raid on 7 April 1951, all raids carried out by the British Royal Marine's 41 Independent Commando were clandestine operations conducted at night and were of two-troop-strength or less. Close approaches were made in rubber boats, later augmented by two-man kayaks. The U.S. Navy supplied the large rubber landing craft, which carried 10 men (coxswain, bowman, and eight paddlers) and up to 400 pounds of explosives packaged in 10-pound bricks. Parent ships, usually assault personnel destroyers (APDs), were ordered not to cross the 100-fathom line due to the threat posed by North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces use of a host of Soviet-supplied mines. Although the APDs often came as close as 70 fathoms, commandos still had to cover about eight miles to shore.


As the APDs closed on the coast to drop the commandos, dim red lights would be switched on in the troop spaces to aid night acclimatization. On "action stations" being sounded, the commandos would fall in at their boat stations. The four ramped landing craft would be lowered and troops would inflate their rubber boats, pass them down into the landing craft, and thence outboard into the water. Each rifle section would embark across the landing craft and the explosives would be handed down and stowed. As each rubber craft was loaded, it would be hooked to tow ropes and stream astern of its landing craft as the APD traveled at about one knot. When all was complete, with five or six rubber boats to each craft, the long tow in to the beach would begin. The landing craft, moving at three or four knots, would be vectored in by the APD, which would follow their progress on radar and pass course corrections over the radio.

About 1,000 yards off the beach, the rubber boats would slip their tows and stand off while the reconnaissance boat, or canoe, closed the beach, sending swimmers in if necessary to check the surf and beach defenses. The covering force would then land, clear the beach area, and deploy to form a defensive perimeter around the objective.

Next to land would be the demolition and humping parties organized by the beachmaster. The assault engineers would lay the charges, which could take up to four hours. Each 10-pound pack had to be carefully laid and connected in a ringmain with Cordtex so all detonated simultaneously. There had to be at least two methods of detonation and customarily several time clocks were used with a 20- to 40-minute setting.

When the assault engineers were ready, fuses were pulled and orders given to withdraw. The force would thin out, return to the beach, and re-embark under the directions of the beachmaster. Rubber boats would be launched and paddled out through the surf to pick up their tows. The waiting landing craft, which could have beached in an emergency to recover casualties or prisoners, would then begin the long haul back to the waiting APDs. As they cleared the area, the charges would detonate, giving the commandos a feeling of intense satisfaction at a job well done. Alongside, the rubber boats would be recovered, deflated, weapons inspected, and troops would go below. Even though officially "dry," U.S. Navy personnel would generously break out the medicinal brandy to help celebrate a successful operation.


National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428241



to the West Coast Support Group, continued to maintain a tight blockade of sea communications. Here, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, employed the British Commando in deception operations on numerous occasions. One of these operations took place on the west coast on 20 May 1951. The West Coast Commander, Admiral Alan K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, commanded the operation with naval gunfire support from the British ships HMS *Ceylon* and HMS *Kenya*. During the afternoon hours of that same day, Royal Navy ships lowered into the water a dozen landing craft, three loaded with commandos, the others empty. The craft then proceeded to shore opposite Cho-do. The commandos remained ashore and conducted a small raid before reembarking on board the waiting craft.

In their last raid of the war, dubbed Operation Swansong, British commandos, led bv Lieutenant Walter and Troop Sergeant Major Roy R. Dodds of D Troop, raided enemy sampans in Wonsan Harbor, destroying many before retiring to the waiting transport Bass. Shortly after returning to their base in Sasebo, Japan, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, acting on orders from Washington and London, replaced the Commando with a force of Korean Marines. Vice Admiral Joy, in a message to Lieutenant Colonel Grant and his men, emphasized the gratitude of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps with their 16 months of dedicated service to the United Nation's efforts in Korea:

It is with the greatest pleasure that I command the officers and men of the 41st Independent Royal Marine Commando. Your superb achievements have been a source of inspiration





National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438735 Royal Marine George Barnes poses on the deck of the Horace A. Bass in mid-December 1951 as the ship and 41 Commando team-up for the last time in an attempt to prevent any enemy movement by rail along the northeast coast of Korea.

to freedom-loving people the world over and will go down in history's brightest page. You have contributed in no small measure toward arresting the forward momentum of the Communist threat to world peace. ... Since the inception of the 41st in August 1950, your courageous combat record against overwhelming odds in the many months of hard fighting has reflected the highest credit upon yourself and your brothers in arms in other branches of the U.N. forces in the field. On behalf of the naval forces in the Far East, I extend most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

Those Royal Marines who had served less than a year overseas were transferred to 3 Commando Brigade in Malaya, while the remainder returned to the United Kingdom. In a formal ceremony at Stonehouse Barrack, Plymouth, on 22 February 1952, 41 Commando was disbanded. It was not until mid-1953 that the 19 surviving Royal Marine prisoners of war were repatriated. (One Marine refused repatriation and made propaganda broadcasts as а Communist sympathizer. He was officially discharged from the Corps as a deserter in January 1954. He returned to the United Kingdom in 1962. No action was taken against him). On 3 April 1957, in a private ceremony at the American ambassador's residence in London, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McCall Pate, presented to the Corps' Commandant General a Presidential Unit Citation, signed Dwight by President D. Eisenhower, officially recognizing 41 Commando for its actions during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. In addition to the unit citation and battle streamer, each surviving and deceased commando, or their family, received a service ribbon that denoted their participation in this legendary campaign.

The ties forged between the two Marine forces during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China grew stronger during their ordeal in Korea as they fought their way to the port of Hungnam during the cold, dark days of December 1950. highest praise The for 41 Commando came from General Smith, who in a letter of commendation to Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, wrote:

The performance of the 41 Commando during their drive from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri, the defense during of Hagaru-ri, and during the advance from Hagaru-ri to the south will, in the perspective of history, take equal rank with the past exploits of the Royal Marines. I can give you no higher compliment than to state your conduct and that of the officers and men under your command was worthy of the highest traditions of Marines.

The value of the raids conducted by the Royal Marines was questioned at the time and since. But eleven of the raids conducted by 41 Commando were directed against the enemy's major supply routes and caused him to divert manpower needed elsewhere to guard its coastal railway and supplies lines. Furthermore, the effect these raids had on the morale of both the Royal Marines, and more importantly the U.S. Marines, was considerable. As demonstrated during the Chosin Reservoir campaign, the presence and battlefield performance of the Royal Marines lifted the spirit of the U.S. Marines. as many in the 1st Marine Division felt they were the only "troops fighting this goddamn war."

As for casualties of 41 Commando, official reports stated the unit lost a total of 116 men during the course of its involvement in the war (August 1950-December 1951). The full impact of the losses is even more dramatic considering the figure constituted one-third of the original force of 300 Marines sent to Korea in August 1950. This high rate of casualties, however, did not diminish the fact that the Royal Marines made an important and lasting contribution to

the United Nations victory in Korea.

Determined to Win: The Korean Marine Corps

On 15 April 1949, the ROK Marine Corps was activated at the Chinhae naval base on the south coast of the peninsula. The personnel, approximately 10 officers, 150 noncommissioned officers. and 300 privates, were drawn from the Korean navy—principally from among those ranks who had previous experience in the Japanese Japanese-sponsored army or Manchurian army. Included among the officers was the Corps' first Commandant, Shin Hyen Jun, a captain in the Korean navy who was made a colonel when he entered the new Marine Corps. In his first speech to his men, Colonel Shin outlined what became the underlying philosophy guiding the Korean Marine Corps (KMC): "let us overcome any difficulty before us. let us unite and let us train ourselves to become the strongest military unit to prepare for any national emergency." While he urged his officers and noncommissioned officers to take care and consideration when training their men, he nonetheless stressed they make a dedicated effort to train their Marines as elite troops so each Marine would "become a lion when we fight against our enemy."

At the time of its activation, the KMC consisted of two rifle companies and a headquarters company and was equipped with weapons of doubtful quality—mostly "handme-down" Japanese rifles with a few machine guns and other equipment. As Lieutenant General Kang Ki-Chun, who served as Commandant in the later half of the 1960s recalled: "it is beyond imagination to express the difficul-

Lieutenant General Shin Hyen Jun

ieutenant General Shin Hyen Jun had an impressive military career that began with the Japanese army, which occupied Manchuria from October 1937 to August 1944. There he served in a variety of military units and as an instructor in various Japanese-administered military schools. From August 1944 to the end of World War II in August 1945, Shin served as a company commander with the Japanese Kwangtung Army in Manchuria. From September 1945 to April 1946, the general served as a battalion commander with the Korean Liberation Army in the Peiping-Teintsin area. He returned home to Korea in June 1946, where he joined the newly-organized Republic of Korea Coast Guard, stationed at Chinhae. In August 1948, he was appointed a commander in the naval forces in the Republic of Korea Navy and participated in the campaign to quell an army rebellion at Yosoo in October 1948. Then Captain Shin Hyen Jun was transferred from the navy to establish the Republic of Korea Marine Corps on 15 April 1949, which is now the official birthday of the founding of this elite force of Marines.

The most pressing problems confronting Colonel Shin during those early days was obtaining equipment, locating a suitable base for the Korean Marines, and recruiting personnel. Shin's instructions to his men were simple: "act like sheep for our brethren, and become a lion when we fight against our enemy." Shin later recounted in his memoirs that "the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 solved these and other immediate problems."

During the Korean War, he participated in the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950, and in the subsequent allied drive to recapture Seoul. He likewise commanded all Korean Marine Corps elements from October 1950 to December 1950 in the Hamhung area during the massive counterguerrilla operation against rogue North Korean army elements. While Commandant, he visited Headquarters United States Marine Corps in December 1952 as a guest of the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. In addition to attending the Japanese Military Academy located at Mukden, Manchuria, Shin graduated from the Korean Marine's Command and General Staff College, located at Chinhae, and the U.S. Army's Command and General

Photo courtesy of the author

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After stepping down from the position as Commandant in October 1953, he remained in the service and organized and led the 1st Republic of Korea Marine Corps Infantry Brigade. He also served on the staff of the republic's joint chiefs and defense department before retiring on 4 July 1961. In addition to his military education, General Shin holds degrees from the University of Nevada at Reno (1962), and Yeonsie University, Seoul (1974). He currently lives in retirement in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

ties of its early beginning," as the force had to literally start from scratch, and in a sense "beg and borrow" equipment and facilities to begin training. The base selected for the KMC was a former Japanese airfield at Duk-San, Chinhae; its abandoned, rusting aviation sheds served as the unit's first barracks.

Shortly after its formation, the KMC was reorganized as an infantry battalion with three rifle companies. With the addition of three more rifle companies comprised of 440 officers and men, recruited primarily from the ROK Navy Recruit Depot's 14th class and formed on 26 August 1949, the now two-battalion Marine Corps began an intensive fivemonth training program. Initially, no U.S. Marine or Army advisors were assigned to the KMC. The Marines were trained primarily in infantry tactics taken from Japanese army infantry training manuals, as many of the officers had served in the Japanese army during World War II.

A Trained Counter-Guerrilla Force

In September, after the 1st, 2d, and 3d companies had been organized and trained, two companies were sent 40 miles west to Jinju to assist in counter-guerrilla operations in the nearby Chidee Mountain redoubt area. But the rugged mountainous region of southern Korea was not the only trouble area. In December, the KMC was transferred to the large island of Jeju-do off the southwest coast of Korea where the Communists were focusing efforts to take control. The Korean Marines fought several engagements with Communist guerrillas, and in cooperation with the local police, quelled a number of Communist-inspired riots among the resident population. Although some guerrillas were killed and others captured, these counterguerilla operations were not too successful. One Korean officer noted "the guerrillas were very adept at camouflage. They hid in holes in the ground, covered themselves with straw or other natural camouflage, while the guerrilla hunters swept over the top of them!" Despite the lack of success, the operations on Jeju-do endeared the KMC to the South Korean inhabitants. When war broke out in June 1950, many of the 3,000 South Koreans that rushed to join the Korean Marine Corps did so because of the publicity it received in its actions on Jeju-do.

As the KMC participated in the Jeju-do counter-guerrilla operations, and the subsequent internal security operations, its ranks continued to grow, adding a 37mm antitank platoon.

The Ghost Killers

In the pre-dawn hours of 25 June 1950, the NKPA invaded its southern neighbor and headed directly down the west coast toward the capital city of Seoul. The KMC was one of the first units thrown into the fight to stem the surge of enemy forces headed toward Seoul, Suwon, and Chunan. After NKPA forces seized Chunan, they pushed toward Kunsan north of Changhang by detouring along the western coastline. To delay the enemy forces, ROK army leaders sent one Marine unit, the Kokilhun unit, comprised of a solitary rifle battalion, to the area in July. After digging in, the

Prior to the landing at Inchon, SSgt Jack F. Carns confers with South Korean Marine officers Lt Suk Hoojing (left), Lt Kim Hong Bai, and Capt Boo Eunseowg, on proper field procedures for military police.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2160



unit successfully withstood repeated enemy attacks, earning the reputation as "the marine unit who kills even ghosts." The Korean Marines, now expanded to three battalions and designated the 1st KMC Regiment, also took part in operations at Mokpo, Chang Hang, Chin-Jong-ri, Jinju, Nam-Won, Masan, and a landing operation on the Tong-Yong Peninsula.

On Tong-Yong, southwest of Pusan, the KMC conducted the first of several independent amphibious landing operations of the war to relieve pressure on South Korean and U.S. Army forces then engaged in the fighting around the Pusan perimeter. As one commentator later wrote, the landing at Tong-Yong: "deserves high admiration as it was regarded as the only attack operation for the defense of U.N. Forces in the midst of a withdrawal operation." Due to the determined efforts of both the ROK army and KMC in the early days of the NKPA offensive, as well as the stiff defense put up by U.S. Army and Marine forces rushed to Korea in July and August, the enemy attack along the Pusan perimeter began to weaken. This determination was evident in the landing at Tong-Yong where, between 23 August and 15 September, Korean Marines under the leadership of Colonel (later lieutenant general) Kim Sung Un landed on Kueje Island and destroyed a NKPA force in a series of bitter exchanges.

On 5 September, in preparation for General Douglas MacArthur's bold stroke at the port of Inchon, operational control of the 1st KMC Regiment passed to Major General Oliver P. Smith's 1st Marine Division, and then to the 5th Marines. While waiting, Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Hagenah, who had been assigned as liaison officer the 1st between Provisional Marine Brigade and the Korean Marines, made arrangements for additional weapons training on Korean Military Advisory Group ranges near Pusan. Training completed, the regiment, totaling approximately 120 officers and 2,600 enlisted, embarked on board the USS Pickaway (APA 222) at Pusan and on the 12th sailed for Inchon.

It was late on D-Day, 15 September, when the 1st KMC Regiment, assigned as division reserve, landed on Red Beach, and in place of the 17th ROK Regiment, began a mopping up campaign in the port city designed to clear out all bypassed enemy forces. Despite the lack of serviceable weapons and other types of military equipment, which were later supplied by the U.S. Eighth Army, Marines of the 1st KMC



1stMarDiv Historical Diaty Photo Supplement, Nov 1950 At Inchon, South Korean Marines board amphibious trucks furnished by the 5th Marines for transportation to the front, where they would join the U.S. Marine regiment in taking Kimpo Airfield.

Regiment, under the command of Colonel Shin, successfully moved through Inchon in search of enemy forces that had hidden among its inhabitants following the landing of United Nations forces. To restore civil authority in the Korean port city as soon as possible, General Smith also tasked the regiment with screening the inhabitants to determine their loyalty to the republic. Once civil authority was restored, Admiral Sohn Won-Yil, the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations, and an honor guard of KMC and U.S. Marines participated in a brief ceremony marking the destruction of the NKPA and restoration of ROK authority. After completing the task at Inchon, the regiment, still under the operational control of the 5th Marines, participated in the drive to Seoul.

Fight for Kimpo Airfield

On the evening of D+1, General Smith issued Operations Order 5-50, which directed the 1st and 5th Marines to drive along the Inchon-Seoul Highway toward Kimpo Airfield. Guarding the left flank of the 5th Marines was Major Kim Yun Kun's 3d KMC Battalion, which would attack north with the ultimate goal of gaining the high ground near Ascom City and west of the airfield. The 2d KMC Battalion, under Major Kim Jong Ki, would remain in Inchon on security duty.

At 0700 on the morning of 17 September, the regiment, less the 2d Battalion, passed through the lines of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and began to systematically clear the western outskirts of Ascom City before turning north toward Seoul, its ultimate objective. This expansive urban area proved to be a thorn in the side of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray's 5th Marines for the next 24 hours as elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, fought enemy troops through the maze of small buildings and thatched huts that had grown into almost two square miles of buildings, streets, and narrow alleys that characterized Ascom City. Originally built by the U.S. Army at the end of World War II, Ascom City proved to be an ideal place for the retreating NKPA to keep a large portion of U.S. and

South Korean Marines occupied in nasty urban fighting.

It took Captain Samuel Jaskilka's Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, an entire morning to methodically eliminate all of the NKPA troops in its sector of Ascom City. In scenes reminiscent of the fighting in Naha on the island of Okinawa during World War II, the Marines had to enter every building to dislodge a determined enemy willing to fight to the death. While Jaskilka's Marines fought it out with the NKPA, the Marines of Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, marched through the heart of Ascom City screening the remainder of the battalion's advance. Only one platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Titlon A. Anderson, reported everything quiet in his sector, although he asserted later that his men did not have time to check all the side streets and blocks of buildings bypassed by other units.

While 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, battled the NKPA along Ascom City's eastern outskirts, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, assisted the

Col Shin Hyen Jun, commanding officer of the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, visits the U.S. Navy command ship Mount McKinley (AGC 7) accompanied by his executive officer, interpreter, and senior U.S. Marine advisor, LtCol Edward R. Hagenah. An aide to Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Thomas Holcomb, and a veteran of both theaters during World War II, LtCol Hagenah served as a Marine advisor until his death in December 1950. Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Gray Research Center



Korean Marines on the other side of the city. Already in regimental reserve, Taplett's battalion had been assigned to occupy a series of assembly areas throughout the day and move forward in bounds behind the main assault elements. The morning's displacement into the western edge of Ascom City happened before the KMC attack had cleared the suburb as planned. Taplett committed his battalion against moderate resistance that had held up the South Korean Marines in their sweep through the town.

Swinging into action, Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, quickly knocked out a NKPA machine gun emplacement in the city as patrols from the same company attacked a strong enemy concentration deployed troop among the buildings. The North Koreans fled after a furious firefight, and in the process left behind 18 confirmed killed at a cost of three Marines wounded. Meanwhile, Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had spread throughout the maze of streets and continued to engage a wellentrenched enemy. As 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, fought the enemy forces, the Korean Marines conducted a passage of lines and attacked NKPA forces north of the city.

After the 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, moved through Ascom City, the M-26 tanks, with Lieutenant Anderson's 1st Platoon riding shotgun, continued toward Kimpo Airfield, five miles away. Marines from 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, arrived at the outer perimeter of the airfield at 1600 that afternoon, and after fighting off a weak enemy counterattack of snipers and a squad of NKPA soldiers, Company D reached the main runway around 1800, where it was subsequently joined by the remaining elements of Lieutenant Colonel Murray's regiment.

Even as the Marines prepared to seize the airfield, the NKPA's 1st Air Force Division, commanded by Brigadier General Wan Yong, prepared to launch a series of counterattacks against the Marines. The division, comprised mostly of support personnel, combat engineers, clerks, logisticians, and infantrymen, put up a stiff fight, and in the counterattacks, one of them at night, tried unsuccessfully to uproot the 5th Marines. The savagery of the fighting was evident in the fanaticism and casualties left behind by the NKPA when U.S. Marines decimated the motley mixture of poorly trained troops of 107th NKPA Regiment, commanded by Colonel Han Choi Han, who fled the battle. In what became an indicator of the nature of the fighting the Marines would encounter in Korea, another NKPA regiment, the 877th Air Force Unit, led by Major Kung Chan So, fought almost to the last man as Murray's Marines killed 395 of that unit's 400 soldiers. Also telling of the savagery of the fighting was another engagement, fought 18 September at 0300 when troops from General Wan's 1st Air Force Division probed the Marine's lines. In repulsing the enemy probes, Sergeant Richard L. Marston jumped up in front of a squad of surprised enemy soldiers and shouted "United States Marines!" and opened fire with his M1 carbine. Supporting automatic rifle fire mowed down a dozen more enemy soldiers before they beat a retreat. The result of hastv Sergeant Marston's squad's nighttime firefight was evident the next morning as sunrise revealed a pile of dead enemy bodies scattered in front of their position.

Eventually, the combined

Marine infantry, mortar, machine gun, artillery, and tank fire succeeded in breaking up repeated enemy attacks as both Marines and enemy soldiers fought, bled, and died in the savage fighting that was oftentimes hand-to-hand as Murray's 5th Marines clung to Kimpo Airfield that night and into the early morning hours. What became even more apparent to all in the battle for the airfield was that the fighting in Korea would be savage, and oftentimes to the death. No matter what iob American or South Korean Marines performed, they would be called on to serve as infantrymen, either as individual riflemen or manning crew-served weapons. Such was the case of Sergeant David R. DeArmond, normally a bulldozer operator attached to the 1st Engineers, who died while operating a machine gun in the Kimpo perimeter. "Every Marine, a riflemen" now took on a new, and permanent meaning.

Eventually, Murray's 5th Marines secured Kimpo Airfield with the 1st KMC Regiment providing security for its flanks. As Murray's forces prepared to move out to seize Seoul, the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions moved out on the 5th Marine's left to flush out enemy soldiers that had retreated to the Kimpo Peninsula. Eventually, the Korean Marines received assistance from the 17th ROK Regiment, which had landed at Inchon for counter-guerrilla duties.

Battle for Seoul

In the late afternoon of 18 September, both X Corps and the 1st Marine Division issued orders for the crossing of the Han River, a move that signaled the beginning of the drive into the South Korean capital. In Division Operations Order 6-50, General Smith directed

Murray's 5th Marines to seize crossing sites along the north bank of the Han and prepare to cross the river while Colonel Puller's 1st Marines continued its attack toward Yungdung-po. The plan was to have the Marines envelop the enemy on the north bank of the river in the vicinity of Seoul and then, in a concerted drive, seize and secure the city and the high ground to the north. While the men of both the 5th and 1st Marines carried through with their crossings, the 2d KMC Battalion, mopping up operations in Inchon completed, advanced and occupied the high ground south of the Han River and provided flank security for the major crossing later that day. With the exception of the 1st Battalion, which met some opposition as it positioned itself to cross the river, the 5th Marines had no trouble on the 19th as it advanced to its assigned positions on the banks of the Han. Murray's Marines occupied all objectives against little or no opposition as the main body of the regiment prepared to cross the river.

General Smith directed the 5th Marines to "cross the Han in the vicinity of Haengju, seize Hill 125, and advance southeast along the railroad to the high ground dominating the Seoul highway." The units attached for the operation were the 2d KMC Battalion; the division Reconnaissance Company; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; and the U.S. Army's Company A, 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. In addition, Smith's orders instructed the 11th Marines to give the 5th Marines priority in artillery fires. In direct support of the main crossings were the 1st Engineer, 1st Shore Party, and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalions.

As envisioned in the division operations order, the Reconnais-



South Korean Marines on board amphibious trucks move offensive against North Korean troops occupying Seoul, toward the Han River from Kimpo Airfield in support of the South Korea's capital city.

sance Company was to lead the advance across the Han River by sending a swimming team across shortly after nightfall. If the swimmers found the bank clear of enemy activity, they would then signal the rest of the men to follow in tracked landing vehicles. Reconnaissance Marines would then seize the bridgehead formed by Hills 95, 125, and 51. After they secured these objectives, they would act as a covering force for Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, at 0400 that same morning. While the 5th Marines passed through the Reconnaissance Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, would follow in column at approximately 0600, with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

remaining in reserve until it also crossed with the 2d KMC Battalion protecting its left flank.

The crossing of the Han began on time, and while enemy fire proved difficult, Lieutenant Colonel Murray's Marines plowed across the river in amphibious tractors and quickly secured their assigned objectives. When it came time for the 2d KMC Battalion to cross, the amphibious trucks became bogged down along the south bank of the river. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge, commanding officer of the 1st Engineers, and the KMC commander, Major Kim Jong Ki, decided the Korean Marines would cross the Han in amphibious tractors to save time and effort. They then

occupied the high ground to the north and northeast (Hill 95), guarding the crossing site. The rest of the regiment, less the 3d Battalion, which remained on security duty at Kimpo, followed.

By 20 September the Marines had established control over Kimpo Airfield. But persistent reports the NKPA planned to retake the airfield continued to circulate. At 0730 on the 21st, a report came to the commanding officer of the 3d KMC Battalion that warned of an attempted NKPA crossing of the Han River about seven miles north of the airfield. Major Kim Yum Kum called in air strikes, which dispersed the enemy force and broke up the attempt to launch a counterattack against United Nations' positions at the airfield. At 1310, however, a U.S. Marine air liaison officer attached to the KMC battalion estimated that at least two NKPA battalions had positioned themselves in front of 3d KMC Battalion's positions. This report placed all units in the Kimpo area on full alert. While the attack never came, there was little doubt the NKPA could, if it desired, launch a counterstrike against U.S. and Korean Marines.

At Kimpo, both the American and South Korean Marines had the support of the 16-inch guns of the battleship USS *Missouri* (BB 63), and guns of the heavy cruisers USS *Toledo* (CA 133) and USS *Rochester* (CA 124) in defense of their perimeter. Naval gunfire was at its best in the Kimpo area, with both cruisers firing a total of 535 eight-inch shells from 21 to 24 September. In one action, Second Lieutenant Joseph R. Wayerski, the shore fire control party officer attached to the 3d KMC Battalion, called in naval gunfire in support of a patrol-sized action by the battalion. With the support of naval gunfire, the Korean Marines wiped out a company-sized pocket of NKPA troops in the vicinity of Chongdong-about three miles northwest of the airfield on the south bank of the Han. In this engagement, the North Koreans lost an estimated 40 men killed with a further 150 taken prisoner. With the airfield fully secured, the 1st Marine Division continued the advance toward Seoul with elements of the 1st, 2d, and 3d KMC Battalions in direct support.

At 0700 on 22 September, the battle for northwest approaches to Seoul began in earnest. From north to south, the three assault battalions of the reinforced 5th

Marines were 3d Battalion, 5th Marines on the left, 1st KMC Battalion, commandered by Major Koh Kil Hun, in the center, and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on the right. The 2d KMC Battalion remained in reserve. All three battalions jumped off from the high ground about three miles southeast of Haengju along a line bounded by Hill 216 to the north, Hill 104 in the center, and Hill 68 to the south. The Korean Marines had the unenviable task of assaulting these interlocking heights, used by the NKPA to provide fields of fire to move up in concealment and launch counterattacks along the 1st Marine Division's perimeter. Almost as soon as the 1st KMC Battalion's attack from Hill 104 began, it ran into stiff opposition as the enemy poured small arms and mortar fire, as well as punishing artillery fire on the South Koreans.

Korean Marines conduct a search of a North Korean captive that was flushed from his nearby hiding place during the allied drive toward Seoul. During that push, the Korean


Marines moved along the right (north) bank on the Han River in conjunction with the 5th Marines.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC349049



Even as the Korean Marines attacked, NKPA detachments continued to infiltrate into prepared defensive positions. Enemy fire held up both the 1st KMC Battalion and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, until concentrated air and artillery strikes removed the stubborn defenders from the base of Hill 104. The fighting was so intense that even air strikes initially failed to dislodge the enemy. By nightfall on 22 September, the Korean Marines had been compelled to withdraw to Hill 104, their original starting point. Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed a rifle company from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, to provide supporting fire the next morning from the adjacent summit of Hill 105-S when Major Koh's battalion renewed its attack in an effort to regain lost ground.

On the morning of 23 September, Murray directed the 1st KMC Battalion to attack from Hill 104 at 0700 in an attempt to straighten the line. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, were to remain in position and assist the advance by fire. The NKPA on Hill 56 greeted the renewed Korean Marine attack with heavy small arms and mortar fire. Although the Marines made a valiant effort, the smothering NKPA fire halted their attack dead in its tracks. Suffering heavy casualties (32 killed and 68 wounded), the South Korean Marine attack made little significant progress-the unit was spent. Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who ordered his Marines to conduct a passage of lines through the KMC battalion and renew the attack on Hill 56. The 2d KMC Battalion was relieved from guarding the crossing site and assigned to screen the left [north] flank of the



5th Marines. Pulled back into division reserve, the 1st KMC Battalion reorganized and reentered the lines in support of Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which set out in bloody fashion to renew the assault. After a furious, daylong battle, Roise's Marines succeeded in breaking through the enemy's main line of resistance. As close air support strikes from Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid's Marine Fighter Squadron 214 broke up an enemy counterattack on nearby Hill 105-S, the weary Marines from both Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, fought way up both hills. their Meanwhile, artillery fire from the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines pounded enemy troop concentrations and kept the NKPA from attacking the dug-in Marines atop the two hills. With the enemy's position silenced, and the remainder of his rifle battalions across the Han River, General Smith ordered his Marines forward into the capital of Seoul.

As senior U.S. Marine advisor to the Korean Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison, in bluntly assessing the South Korean Marine assault from Hill 104, later wrote:

The Korean Marines were very valuable in mopping up, screening, and reconnaissance missions because of their familiarity with the terrain and the civilian population. Their limited training, almost complete lack of experience in the use of supporting arms, and the absence of certain tools, e.g., flamethrowers, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, etc., rendered them, however, incapable at that time of successfully assaulting a heavily defended position. Their failure here was a bitter pill to the Koreans, but it was only to be expected.

At 0700 on 25 September, the 1st Marine Division launched the final phase of its attack on Seoul. As outlined in the division Operations Order 11-50, the Korean Marines, in unison with their U.S. Marine counterparts, were assigned the mission of liberating the capital and clearing it of enemy forces. Major Kim Jong Ki's 2d Battalion,

attached to Regimental Combat Team 1 (1st Marines), was ordered to seize the part of Seoul within zone of action and the high ground beyond the northeastern outskirts of the capital, about six miles from its original jump off positions. As outlined in that order, the zone of action, which ranged from one to one-and-ahalf miles wide, carried the attack through the heart of the city, with South Mountain on the right and Ducksoo Palace on the left. In addition to acting as flank security, the battalion was assigned mopping up operations once the capital was secured. At the conclusion of the operation, the 2d Battalion was to revert to its own regimental control.

Major Koh's 1st KMC Battalion, attached to Regimental Combat Team 5 (5th Marines), and the division's reconnaissance company, was to seize the part of Seoul within its zone of action and the high ground overlooking the Seoul-Uijongbu road six miles from the line of departure. About one-and-a-half miles wide, this zone included the northwest seccity tion of the and the Government Palace. Like the 2d Battalion. Koh's battalion would then mop up any lingering resistance. The remaining units of the regiment (less 1st and 2d Battalions) were designated as the division reserve. The regiment was to be prepared to reassume control of its detached battalions and then occupy Seoul.

As the 5th Marines moved out to attack the NKPA, elements of Lieutenant Colonel Newton's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, along with the division's reconnaissance company and 1st KMC Battalion, acted as a blocking force designed to prevent the NKPA from reinforcing its tenuous positions on Hills 338, 216, and 296. Most heavy fighting on the 25th

U.S. Navy Corpsman Wendal D. Lewark treats a wounded South Korean Marine as another looks on at an aid station in Seoul. During the battle for the capital, Korean Marine losses were more than 50 killed and 100 wounded.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420501



took place within the 1st Marines zone of action. As the morning of 26 September dawned, the NKPA remained entrenched in Seoul, determined to fight to the death for every inch of the city, even though X Corps had proclaimed the capital taken. Division Operations Order 12-50, issued at 1230, directed a continuation of the attack and committed Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.'s 7th Marines. Litzenberg's regiment, augmented by the newly organized 5th Separate KMC Battalion. was given the mission of "pinching out" the 5th Marines beyond the Government Palace and attacking abreast of the 1st Marines toward the northeast. (On 25 September, the 5th Battalion, in addition to the 26th Company, landed at Inchon and moved up by truck to the regimental assembly area in the southern part of Seoul.) In the 7th Marines zone of advance north of the city lay the northern half of Hill 338, Hill 342, Hill 133, Hill 343, and Hill 171, some of the toughest real estate vet encountered by both the U.S. and Korean Marines as they pushed forward to liberate the capital. Colonel Lewis B. Puller's 1st Marines, with the 2d KMC Battalion, was to drive northward from Hills 97 and 82 in lower Seoul, clear the center of enemy forces, then wheel to the right to take Hill 133 in the northeastern outskirts.

The 5th Marines, with the 1st KMC Battalion attached, was assigned to support Colonel Litzenberg's attack until the two forces converged to allow Murray's regiment to reassemble in division reserve and gradually relieve elements of the 7th Marines. The 1st KMC Regiment was still under orders to resume control of its detached battalions for the occupation of Seoul. With X Corps now ashore and opera-

tional, the 3d KMC Battalion was detached from the 1st Marine Division and assigned to the U.S. Army's 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for operations in the Kimpo Peninsula. There, the 3d Battalion undertook counter-guerrilla operations to clear out the remaining pockets of enemy stragglers that posed a security threat.

Meanwhile, the 1st KMC Battalion moved into position between the division's Reconnaissance Company and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which had established itself on Hill 296. In the final battle for Seoul. as the U.S. Marines fought their way through the rubble, Korean Marine and army elements continued to neutralize pockets of stubborn enemy By 1630 resistance. on 28 September, the remaining elements of the NKPA in Seoul had either been annihilated or had abandoned the city and headed north toward the 38th Parallel, returning along the same route they used into the city only two months before.

On the morning of 29 September, while the battle still raged in the suburbs, the legal government of Korea was reinstated in a ceremony held in Changdok Palace. Outside the palace and along the route taken by General Douglas MacArthur and Korean President Syngman Rhee from Kimpo Airfield across the Han River to the capitol building, a Korean Marine or soldier with fixed bayonet stood guard every few paces. As an additional precaution, a second line of security manned by U.S. Marines was established a block or two on either side of the ceremonial route and on the high ground outside the palace.

Instead of taking over security responsibility for the capital, the 1st KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions) was directed to advance about 18 miles east of Seoul and establish blocking positions near the junction of the Han and North Han Rivers. An important road from the south crossed the North Han at this point, and it was thought the enemy retreating from the south might use this route. The Korean Marines met only scattered resistance.

On 6 October, X Corps directed Major Kim Yun Kun's 3d KMC Battalion to conduct a reconnaissance in force on Kang Wha Island to "ferret out any remaining Commies." Kang Wha lies a little less than a mile off the northwest tip of Kimpo Peninsula, and it was here that Captain McLane Tilton and his Asiatic Fleet Marines stormed ashore in 1871 and captured the Korean forts guarding the Han River approaches to the capital. However, the operation was cancelled and the 3d Battalion was directed to join the rest of the regiment in an assembly area near Inchon.

The Korean Marines' role in the fight from Inchon to Seoul was instrumental in the overall victory achieved by United Nations forces. And that victory deserved a little celebration, as Lieutenant Colonel Harrison later recalled:

On 10 October a parade of the 1st KMC Reg[imen]t with all four battalions was held at an athletic field in Inchon. Generals Smith and [Edward A.] Craig, together with the senior officers of the Division staff and regimental commanders, attended. General Smith trooped the line and then took the march past from a hastily constructed reviewing stand on the side of the field. The Korean Marines not only produced a band but also a set of U.S. Colors manufactured



Photo: "A Marines Matches Thousands of Enemies" TSgt Yang Byung Soo and Put Choi Kuk Bang hoist the Republic of Korea's national colors at the capitol building in Seoul.

by themselves. For an organization which was so young, and which had just completed a rigorous campaign, their performance and appearance quite commendable. was After the review the Korean officers and their American guests repaired to the large school building nearby where they were treated to beer and cocktails by the young ladies of Inchon who had dug out their best silk finery for the occasion. ... It was a pleasant diversion from the grueling tasks of the past fortnight.

The Inchon-Seoul campaign was over, and the 1st KMC Regiment focused its efforts on preparing for the next—the drive north across the 38th Parallel.



On 10 October, as U.S. Marine Gens Oliver P. Smith and Edward A. Craig stood by with senior officers of the division staff and regimental commanders, Korean Marines held a

Photo: 1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Oct 1950 victory celebration and formal parade at Inchon following the Seoul campaign.

Beyond the 38th Parallel

Still clad in summer utilities and light rubber shoes, the Korean Marines, with the assistance of their U.S. Marine liaison officers and advisors, attempted to secure winter clothing during the short break in combat at Inchon. Winters, everyone knew, could get "mighty cold in North Korea." The 3d Battalion, for example, managed to get sufficient gear from the 1st Marine Division to give each Korean a pair of woolen trousers, two blankets, a wool scarf, and a couple of pairs of socks, but no wool shirts, overcoats, or leather shoes.

On 18 October, three of the KMC battalions embarked on landing ships for the port of Wonsan. Plans for the Wonsan operation generally followed the same scheme employed during the Inchon-Seoul campaign—a Korean battalion would be parceled out to the U.S. Marine infantry regiments. Having decided the regimental headquarters would have no real role to play and would be a useless appendage, Colonel Shin and his staff did not accompany his battalions by ship, but arrived later by air.

After several days of steaming back and forth off the east coast of Korea between Pusan and Wonsan, mine sweepers finally cleared lanes for the landing ships to drop anchor. But as one Marine advisor remembered, "both the Korean army moving rapidly up the east coast on Shank's mare and the USO troupe with Bob Hope and curvaceous Marilyn Maxwell had beaten us to the objective."

Landing in late October, the KMC battalions, still under operational control of the 1st Marine Division, were assigned the on-call mission of securing and maintaining the main supply route in the Muchon-Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area. There was little to do until early November when the southern boundary of X Corps was moved farther south and the U.S. Marines were ordered north in the advance toward the northern border of Korea. On 2 November, the battalions, now detached from the 1st Marine Division, were given responsibility for the zone south of the 39th Parallel, which they would assume over the next several days. The relief of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, for example, was completed by Korean Marines that same day at Anbyon, eight miles southeast of Wonsan, freeing the U.S. Marine unit to rejoin its regiment that was moving north.

On 10 November, Major Kim Yun Kun's battalion was rushed to reinforce two squads of Marines of Second Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason's 2d Platoon, Company H, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Majon-ni. Those Marines were threatened with encirclement by remnants of the 45th NKPA Regiment, 15th NKPA Division. In the fight that ensued during the night and early morning of 11-12 November, Lieutenant Mason's Marines and Major Kun's battalion several determined. repulsed although futile, attacks by the enemy force. By 0600, what remained of the enemy regiment beat a hasty retreat as it abandoned the attack on Majon-ni and shifted its focus to guerrilla warfare in the Imjin Valley. The relief of the Marines and KMC battalion at Majon-ni began the next afternoon as elements of the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, arrived to take over the perimeter. With the movement of the 1st Marines northward, X Corps attached the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions to the army unit and directed the two battalions to assume responsibility for a zone to the south and west of Kojo. (The Chinese character for "4th" is the same as for "death," hence no 4th Battalion. Different logic was applied, however, in numbering companies, thus no objection to a 4th company in the 1st Battalion.) The 2d KMC Battalion, which had been detached to conduct counter-guerrilla operations in the Mokpo area of southwest Korea, rejoined the

BGen Shin Hyen Jun meets with MajGen Oliver P. Smith on board the Mount McKinley. As Shin had been just promoted, MajGen Smith "dug up a couple of spare stars and pinned them on him." Here, Gen Shin is flanked on his right by Capt Martin J. Sexton, aide to MajGen Smith, and BGen Shin's interpreter, and on the left by his executive officer.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4436 A South Korean Marine, who fought with American Marines at Inchon and Seoul and accompanied them into northeast Korea, interviews civilians at a checkpoint near Wonsan in an effort to restore order.

other two battalions in late November.

As Chinese Communist forces continued to push south from the Yalu River and the 1st Marine Division fought its way from the Chosin Reservoir to the coast in early December, the Korean Marines, still attached to the 3d Infantry Division, moved to Wonsan where they assisted in defending the harbor and ensuring the safe evacuation of allied troops and Korean refugees. On 7 and 9 December, after covering the removal of Marine Aircraft Group 12's equipment, the U.S. Navy withdrew the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions by landing ship and transported them to Pusan. Even as they withdrew, their performance in the defense of Wonsan was "outstanding." Six days later, the U.S. Air Force's Combat Cargo Transport Command moved the 2d and 5th KMC Battalions at Hamhung. In mid-December, the regimental headquarters and all four battalions were reunited at the Chinhae naval base on the south coast of Korea.

Reorganization and Refitting

At Chinhae, the 1st KMC Regiment underwent a period of rest, rehabilitation, training, and reorganization. During this time, the first substantial number of U.S. Marine Corps liaison teams joined the Korean Marine Corps as advisors. The first such assignment occurred prior to the Inchon-Seoul operation. This team consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hagenah, who was the acting liaison officer, three corporals, who were radio operators, and one corporal who drove a jeep mounted with a built-in radio. This arrangement lasted throughout the Inchon-Seoul campaign. At the conclusion of the campaign and upon the recommendation of the liaison officer attached to the first team, its numbers were temporarily expanded to include a senior advisor (a lieutenant colonel): battalion liaison officers (lieutenants); S-1 (personnel) and S-4 (supply, a major or captain); bulldozer operators (corporals or privates first class); and jeep drivers (corporals or private first class). While the number of liaison personnel still proved to be inadequate to deal with the multitude of organizational and logistics problems associated with the original composition of the regiment, the liaison group nonetheless remained intact until late December when the Korean Marines returned to Chinhae and the group was disbanded.

In mid-January 1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was re-attached to the 1st Marine Division and Colonel Shin requested through the senior U.S. Marine advisor that, if and when a liaison team returned to the KMCs, it be enlarged to include an intelligence

officer, operations officer, four liaison officers. communications officer, medical officer, clerk typists, intelligence clerk, supply clerk, two navy corpsmen, ambulance driver, and four drivers/mechanics (one for each battalion). Unfortunately, when U.S. Marine advisors returned to the regiment, the team's composition remained about the same as before. This remained the case until the 1st Marine Division established a fulltime U.S. Marine Provisional Liaison Team, which gradually increased as the Korean Marine Corps undertook more of the fighting from mid-1951 through the end of the war in July 1953.

While the majority of the work done by the U.S. Marine advisory teams took place behind the lines, it often involved being on the frontlines and in the line of fire. In some cases, enemy fire wounded or killed an advisor. In one such instance around the "Punchbowl" on 31 August 1951, an enemy mine severely wounded Colonel Kim Tae Shik, 1st KMC Regiment's commanding officer, and U.S. Marine advisor Second Lieutenant James F. McGoey, as both men returned from an inspection tour of the frontline companies.

Despite the ever-present dangers of the battlefield, the advisors working with the Korean Marines were enthusiastic and patient as they instructed their South Korean counterparts in the intricacies of logistical support of a battalion in the attack, fire support, and administrative matters. Colonel Kim made special note of one Marine advisor, a Major Jennings, USMCR, who remained with the Korean Marines for almost a year. As Colonel Kim stated: "Jennings was a real go-getter and was a great help to him in his logistical duties."


Marines, each U.S. Marine advisor needed a working knowledge of Japanese because of its common usage, be mature, and above all else, be patient, as well as being technically and tactically knowledgeable in his particular military specialty. Prior to their assignment, advisors were instructed to be "respectful and understanding," as well as to avoid "talking down to" their South Korean counterparts. They were to "advise" or "recommend" and not "order" their Korean allies to take a particular course of action. Lastly, Marine officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to advisory duty were to be mindful of the cultural setting in which they would be working. They were not to expect that "this was the way it was done at Quantico or Parris Island," and they were to avoid involving themselves in matters beyond their advisory mission. For the most part, the advisory effort worked very well.

The Force Matures

Rested and refitted, the 1st KMC Regiment once again entered the line on 24 January in the Andong-Tongduk area, northwest of Pohang. As General Kang later noted: "the purpose of this move was to engage and defeat the 10th NKPA Division, which had infiltrated the main line of resistance by moving Taibaek along the Mountain Range." To stabilize the rear area behind the lines of the U.S. Eighth Army and root out this enemy, the 1st KMC Regiment and the 1st Marine Division conducted a massive counter-guerrilla campaign.

With Lieutenant Colonel Harrison and a group of division liaison and advisory officers along as observers, the four battalions of the 1st KMC Regiment moved out

To work with the Korean



from Chinhae by landing ship and truck. On 26 January, Operations Order 4-51 assigned to the Korean Marines Sector F astride the Yongdok-Andong highway, which had been carved out of Sectors C and D held by the 7th and 11th Marines respectively. They were to conduct daily patrols from positions near Yongdok, Chaegoktong, and Chinan-dong, preventing the enemy from penetrating their sector.

The regiment opened its com-

mand post at Yongdok on 29 January. The first operations order issued divided Sector F into three parts, assigning the western, central, and eastern sub-sectors to the 3d, 1st, and 2d Battalions respectively. The 5th Battalion, meanwhile, was assigned to the 1st Marines, which was patrolling in the Andong area.

The first days of February saw continuous action by the U.S. and South Korean Marines as both forces sought to "snuff out" the remnants of the NKPA's *10th* Division. With reports that portions of the NKPA's 25th and 27th Regiments were fleeing toward the zone of the 5th Marines, Korean and U.S. Marines prepared to launch a "knock out blow" against the retreating enemy, who anticipated the attack and shifted their northward refreat toward Topyong-dong. There, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, planted a well-laid trap as they closed in from one side while the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions blocked the roads in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha-dong. Elements of the two enemy regiments were forced to break into small groups and scatter to avoid utter destruction by the desultory fire of the U.S. and South Korean Marines.

The nearest the NKPA came to success occurred on 5 February, after the 1st and 2d KMC Battalions had established zone blocking positions at the request of the 7th Marines, which had been relentlessly pursuing the shattered enemy forces. In a sharp firefight, a platoon from Lieutenant Colonel Ryen Bong Seng's 2d KMC Battalion stumbled into a well-prepared NKPA defensive position equipped with 81mm mortars and heavy and light machine guns a few miles southwest of Yongdok. In the exchange that followed, the NKPA forced the Korean Marines to withdraw with a loss of 1 killed, 8 wounded, and 24 missing, in addition to the loss of small arms and other equipment. However, by evening all of the missing had been located. This would be the only success the NKPA achieved during the Pohang counter-guerrilla campaign.

In a follow-on assault, the battalion avenged the previous day's actions as it succeeded in taking the same position. In a sign of the ever-increasing sophistication, Lieutenant Colonel Ryen skillfully